Why are the Malays still poor after more than 60 years under Umno’s governance?

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Why are the Malays still poor after more than 60 years under Umno’s governance?

KUALA LUMPUR, Aug 8, 2026: Why are the Malays, especially those in the rural areas, still poor in Malaysia?

Have they not been governed by the racial and religious bigoted Umno-led Barisan Nasional (BN) pencuri-pencuri (thieves) since Merdeka (Independence) 1957?

That is more than 60 years or six decades of governance, failing to lift the financial and economic statues of the Malays.

And, why is the Singapore Dollar three times more in value than the Ringgit, despite Singapore having zero natural resources but Malaysia is blessed with an abundance of natural resources?

So, who to blame? Others?

The fact remains Umno has been plundering the wealth of the rakyat dan negara (people and country)f or itself, meaning the elite nepotistic Malay politicians and their cronies.

This is a montage of only a few reasons why the Malays are still poor today after Umno’s more than 60 years of governance:

  

No News Is Bad News reproduces below The Coverage’s post on Rafizi lecturing the racial and religious bigoted Kedah MB Sanusi’s rhetoric:

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Rafizi Lectures Sanusi on His ‘Tanah Melayu’ and Bumiputera Equity Rhetoric

8 August, 2026

 

A refined critique of Rafizi’s lecture to Sanusi regarding his ‘Tanah Melayu’ and Bumiputera equity rhetoric, from his latest podcast, YBM Episode 58.

Rafizi’s latest dismantling of Sanusi’s Tanah Melayu rhetoric cuts through the usual noise with unusual clarity.

It is both unfair and dishonest to keep blaming Chinese Malaysians for the poverty and underperformance of the Malay community.

The real record shows something else entirely.

Political power has never left Malay hands. UMNO ruled for more than sixty years. Mahathir returned for a second stint. Perikatan Nasional governed for 33 months.

Every federal government since independence has been Malay-led. Cabinets have been overwhelmingly Malay.

If the outcomes remain disappointing, the responsibility sits with those who held continuous power — not with a community that never controlled the state.

History does not support the victim narrative either.

Rafizi is right to return to Perjanjian Pangkor. Malay elites fought among themselves over succession and power. They invited British intervention. They collaborated with British administrators and Chinese mining interests in factional contests and civil conflicts.

Land portfolios at both state and federal levels have overwhelmingly remained under Malay control.

Non-Malays did not seize the land; Malay elites signed, allocated, and sold it.

The wealth story is equally inverted. Chinese corporate equity has not exploded. It has fallen sharply from historical highs near 70 percent to around 25 percent and continues to shrink.

Foreign ownership now stands at roughly 45.5 percent. The official Bumiputera equity figure of 18.4 percent excludes GLCs.

Add the approximately 18.7 percent GLC layer and the combined figure reaches about 37.1 percent — already higher than Chinese private holdings.

Meanwhile, major Malay-led institutions such as Tabung Haji and FELDA have been mired in scandals and governance failures under continuous Bumiputera leadership.

These are not Chinese failures. They are failures under Malay political and institutional monopoly.

Rafizi’s sharper structural observation strengthens the case further.

Chinese commercial success was partly the result of occupational channelling.

Malays were absorbed into the civil service and later the expanding GLC complex, creating a relative comfort zone of secure employment, pensions, and institutional protection.

Chinese Malaysians, with fewer pathways into those preferential systems, were pushed more heavily into private business.

Security reduces the pressure to take risk. Exclusion increases it.

Blaming Chinese Malaysians for Malay poverty or economic underperformance is both factually weak and politically corrosive.

Malay political power has been continuous.

Institutional control has been extensive. Preferential absorption into the civil service and GLCs was deliberate policy. Equity and broad-based entrepreneurial outcomes still lagged. Foreign capital expanded. Major Malay-led institutions underperformed.

The rhetoric of existential loss—“the Malays only have Tanah Melayu”—therefore functions less as diagnosis than as mobilisation that distracts from elite performance.

The same political class that expanded Malay-preferential institutions also wrote the rules of private capital, licensing, and procurement.

Why did decades of political monopoly, preferential public employment, GLC dominance, and institutional control fail to produce stronger private-sector capacity and wider wealth diffusion among ordinary Bumiputera households?

Sanusi’s framing externalises failure.

Rafizi correctly refuses that displacement.

The harder task is refusing to let any Malay political faction treat institutional underperformance, patronage, and stalled mobility as someone else’s problem.