Right-wing Malay groups damning multi-racial Malaysia

Share to help stimulate good governance, ensure future of people & M’sia

No News Is Bad News

For image info, go to https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/the-rise-and-rise-of-malaysias-nationalist-right-wing/ 

Right-wing Malay groups damning multi-racial Malaysia

KUALA LUMPUR, Nov 2, 2025: The Coverage has posted two damning articles on the so-called Madani Unity Government (UG)’s trade and economic policies, and the depth of the right-wing Malay groups’ hatred for the Malaysian Chinese.

Even Prof Dr James Chin has commented on the article:

James Chin

Please read carefully—this is only four pages long.

It argues that right-wing Malay forces in Malaysia would rather let the country's wealth fall into foreign hands than into non-Bumi (read: Chinese) hands. This speaks volumes about their hatred for the Malaysian Chinese. They stay silent when wealth slips into foreign control because many foreign companies can legally bypass the Bumi quota.

We shouldn't be shocked that this is happening.

 

Read it carefully and decide for yourself. While I disagree with some of the figures presented here, I fully agree with the core argument: right-wing Malay forces would rather see foreigners scoop up corporate wealth while letting Chinese corporate holdings crumble. They simply cannot accept the Chinese as full citizens. I hope you'll share this widely to make it go viral. Credit goes to The Coverage.

No News Is Bad News is refraining from making any further comments but reproduces below the two The Coverage articles for readers to digest and form their own conclusions/opinions:

News

Non-Bumis Equities Down 45%, Bumiputera Up 15%, Foreigners Up 15% – Malays Poorer, Non-Malays Crushed, Foreigners Winning

1 November, 2025

 

In Malaysia’s ongoing discourse on economic equity, a persistent narrative has emerged, particularly from certain political quarters like the ultra-Malay faction within PAS, that paints non-Bumiputera communities – primarily ethnic Chinese and Indians – as the primary culprits behind Malay poverty and economic inequality. This rhetoric, often amplified through fiery speeches and social media campaigns, creates an imaginary enemy out of fellow Malaysians, framing the struggle as a zero-sum battle between Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera. Supporters are urged to view non-Bumiputera as hoarders of wealth, obstructing the path to prosperity for the majority. But this is a dangerous distortion of the facts. It’s time to confront the truth with hard data: non-Bumiputera equity ownership has plummeted from around 70% in the pre-New Economic Policy (NEP) era to just 25% today, while foreign equity has ballooned to 45.5% and shows no signs of slowing.

Malays aren’t getting richer, non-Malays are getting squeezed, and foreigners are reaping the rewards. This isn’t empowerment; it’s a lose-lose for all Malaysians. Instead of pitting brother against brother, we must unite under a Malaysian agenda: local ownership versus foreign dominance. Focusing on Bumiputera vs. non-Bumiputera only funnels the spillover benefits to outsiders. Meritocracy, without this divisive lens, would at least ensure that hard work rewards Malaysians first – not foreigners.

The Hard Facts: A Historical Plunge in Local Equity, Foreign Gains at Everyone’s Expense

To understand the betrayal of the NEP’s original promise – eradicating poverty and restructuring society without alienating communities – let’s examine the data on corporate equity ownership, primarily based on market value shares in Bursa Malaysia and broader corporate holdings as reported by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and Ministry of Economy. The NEP, launched in 1971 amid the ashes of the 1969 racial riots, set ambitious targets: 30% equity for Bumiputera (up from ~2%), 40% for non-Bumiputera (down from ~70%), and 30% for foreigners. The goal was balance, not blame. But five decades later, the reality is starkly different, with foreign investors – not non-Bumiputera – as the biggest winners.

Year/Period	Bumiputera (%)	Non-Bumiputera (%)	Foreign (%)	Key Notes/Source
1970 (Pre-NEP)	~2%	~63-70% (Chinese ~63%, Indian ~1%)	~30%	Dominance of non-Bumiputera due to historical trade roles; Bumiputera largely agrarian. (EPU Historical Data)
1990 (End of NEP Phase 1)	~20-23%	~35-40%	~30-35%	NEP targets nearly met for non-Bumiputera; initial Bumiputera gains via trusts like PNB. But nominee holdings masked true distribution. (RMK-6)
2000	~19-20%	~35%	~35-40%	Post-Asian Financial Crisis; foreigners bought low. Stagnation begins. (EPU Mid-Term Review)
2010	~23%	~34%	~37%	Peak relative stability; but FDI liberalization accelerates foreign inflows. (9th Malaysia Plan)
2015	16.2%	30.7%	45.3%	Sharp foreign surge post-Global Financial Crisis recovery; locals squeezed. (EPU 2015 Report)
2019-2024 (Latest Available)	17.2-18.4%	25%	45.5%	No significant change; Bumiputera stuck below 30% target. Includes PNB assets (RM349 billion as of Dec 2024, ~10% of Bursa cap). Nominee/Other: 12.3%. (EPU 2023; Kongres Ekonomi Bumiputera 2024; Teraju Reports)

Key Insights from the Data:

· Non-Bumiputera Decline: From Dominance to Decline. In 1970, non-Bumiputera held the lion’s share due to colonial-era economic structures, but this was never sustainable or fair. By design, NEP redistributed ~45% away from them over decades – through mandatory 30% Bumiputera allocations in IPOs, scholarships, and contracts. Yet, their share didn’t stabilize at the targeted 40%; it eroded further to 25% by 2019, per EPU figures. Crises like 1997-98 and COVID-19 forced sales at depressed prices, while policies like privatization caps (foreign max 25% in some cases, but often waived) favored inflows elsewhere. This isn’t “hoarding” – it’s erosion. Non-Bumiputera households have seen wealth stagnation or decline, with median incomes barely keeping pace with inflation (e.g., Chinese median household income: RM7,210/month in 2022 vs. RM5,940 for Indians, per DOSM).

· Bumiputera Stagnation: The 30% Mirage. Despite trillions in allocations (e.g., RM1.5 trillion in Bumiputera programs since 1971), ownership hovers at 17-18%. Why? Leakages via cronies, GLC inefficiencies (e.g., Khazanah’s RM5.1 billion profit in 2024 mostly reinvested abroad), and nominee complexities hide true holdings. Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli noted in March 2024 at the Bumiputera Economic Congress that the 30% target is outdated – we need focus on control and participation, not just shares. PNB’s 86% Bumiputera investors (13 million accounts) is progress, but it’s collective, not individual wealth-building.

· Foreign Boom: The Unseen Beneficiary. Foreign equity exploded from ~30% to 45.5% between 1970 and 2019, driven by liberal FDI policies (e.g., 100% foreign ownership in manufacturing/services since 2000s). MITI data shows FDI inflows hit RM72.3 billion in 2023, up from RM48.1 billion in 2021. Sectors like tech and EVs (RM2.77 billion allocation in Budget 2024) attract giants like Intel and Tesla, often with minimal local spillovers. The 70-30 foreign-Bumiputera split in sensitive sectors (e.g., transport, per APAD licenses) is enforced, but in open ones, foreigners dominate. Projections? With ASEAN’s growth and ringgit weakness, foreign share could hit 50% by 2030, per ISEAS analyses.

This isn’t abstract: Malaysians of all stripes are poorer for it. Household debt is at 93% of GDP (2024), inequality (Gini 0.41) persists, and wealth gaps widen – not between ethnicities, but between locals and globals. Non-Malays lose ground without privileges; Malays gain theoretically but see little trickle-down (e.g., 40% rural Bumiputera poverty rate, DOSM 2023).

Manufacturing Enemies While Foreigners Win

PAS’s ultra-Malay wing, with its “Ketuanan Melayu” absolutism, perpetuates this ethnic binary daily – from rallies decrying “Chinese dominance” to policies limiting non-Bumiputera in trade (e.g., 30% Bumiputera quota in wholesale). It’s a lie that sustains power: blame the neighbor, not the system. But facts expose it. By obsessing over non-Bumiputera “threats,” we ignore how these caps create vacuums filled by foreigners. Example: In property deals over RM20 million from Bumiputera sellers, non-Bumiputera buyers need 30% Bumiputera equity (EPU rule, as in Gadang Holdings’ 2024 rejection). Result? Deals stall or pivot to foreign funds, who bypass via JVs.

This zero-sum ethnic focus is self-defeating. As Lim Teck Ghee highlighted in 2006 (and echoed in 2021 FMT op-eds), stats are “charades” – nominee bundling understates Bumiputera while overemphasizing ethnic divides. The real loser? Malaysian sovereignty. Foreign entities like sovereign funds (e.g., Singapore’s Temasek) control key assets, repatriating profits (RM100+ billion annually, est. BNM).

Meritocracy with Unity

End ethnic quotas in education/business; reward skills. Non-Bumiputera growth isn’t a threat – it’s a buffer against foreign takeovers. United, we hit 70% local ownership; divided, foreigners feast.

PAS and like-minded ultras: Stop lying to your supporters. The enemy isn’t the non-Bumiputera family next door, scraping by with 25% equity after decades of sacrifice. It’s the foreign boardroom siphoning our future. Let’s build a Malaysia where merit lifts all – Bumiputera, non-Bumiputera, together against the world. Because in division, we all lose; in unity, we win back our economy. The data demands it; our shared prosperity depends on it.

Why Do Hardline Waluan Supporters Cheer When Non-Malays Suffer – While Foreigners Get Richer?

Let’s ask the uncomfortable questions the ultras refuse to answer:

1. Are Non-Malays Not Malaysian Too? We bleed the same red, pay the same taxes, and die for the same flag. Yet every time a Chinese or Indian business shrinks, certain Waluan keyboards explode with “Finally, Melayu menang!” – as if our GDP is a football match.

2. Zero-Sum Delusion = National Suicide They celebrate non-Bumi equity down 45% (70% → 25%) like it’s a trophy. Reality check:

· Foreigners up 15% (30% → 45.5%) in the same breath.

· That 15% is RM 1.2 trillion in market value (Bursa 2024 est.) leaving Malaysia forever. When non-Bumis circulate money locally:

· +RM 1 spent = RM 2.50 GDP multiplier (DOSM Input-Output Table 2022)

· 75% of non-Bumis are M40/B40 (DOSM 2023) – they spend locally, hire locals, pay RM 48 billion in personal income tax yearly. Foreigners? Repatriate RM 100+ billion profits annually (BNM 2024).

Celebrating non-Bumi poverty = cheering money flight to Singapore, London, New York.

“Malay Success” Measured by Others’ Failure? This is the crab-in-bucket mentality: pull the guy above you down so you look taller. Data slaps it in the face:

· T20 households: Only 18% non-Bumi vs 78% Bumi in GLC/GLIC exec roles (Teraju 2024).

· Non-Bumi uni intake: <15% of public uni seats despite >50% of STPM top-scorers (MOHE 2023).

· Business loans: MARA/TEKUN = RM 12 billion (Bumi-only); SME Bank non-Bumi allocation = <8%.

They work 3× harder, pay full taxes, and never play victim. When their equity shrinks? Silence. No riots. No sob stories. Just grind.

Why Pick Fights with Fellow Malaysians – But Hug Foreign Tycoons?

· Tesla, Microsoft, Google: 100% foreign ownership allowed.

· Local non-Bumi SME: Must give 30% equity to Bumi or lose government contracts. Result? Foreigners buy the 30% at fire-sale prices via JVs. Waluan logic: “Better a Singapore fund owns it than Ah Chong.”

After 67 Years of Independence – Still No Malaysian Agenda?

· Bumiputera Agenda: Spoken every year since 1957.

· Malaysian Agenda: Mentioned in speeches… then forgotten. Imagine if we flipped the script:

“Us vs The World” – 70% local equity (Bumi + non-Bumi pooled) Meritocracy + Unity – Top 1% talent regardless of race, competing with Shenzhen, not Shah Alam.

China did it: Han Chinese + minorities = 1.4 billion vs the world. We do it: Malay + Chinese + Indian + Kadazan = 33 million vs the world.

Evil-Hearted? Or Just Brainwashed? The ultras aren’t evil – they’re addicted to the drug of ethnic victimhood. Every time a non-Bumi succeeds, it’s framed as “stolen Malay wealth”.

Truth: No non-Bumi robbed a sen from Felda, PNB, or Tabung Haji. But foreign funds own 45.5% of Bursa – and zero accountability.

Non-Bumi equity ↓45% → Foreigners ↑15% = RM 1.2 TRILLION LOST

75% non-Bumis = M40/B40 → spend locally, create jobs

Zero-sum hate = money flight

Unleash non-Bumis + meritocracy = 70% Malaysian equity

Us vs The World > Bumi vs Non-Bumi

Stop suppressing talent. Start competing globally.

That would take us right back to the pre-1957 colonial era, when the economy was mostly in foreign (British) hands. What is even crazier now is that many of these foreign money come via Singapore, and the right wing hates Singapore.

This is the depth of the right-wing Malay groups' hatred for the Malaysian Chinese.

News

How Thailand and Cambodia Safeguard Their Futures While Malaysia Dances with the Devil in the U.S. Trade Deal

1 November, 2025

 

In the high-stakes poker game of international trade, Southeast Asia’s nations are playing with loaded decks. The United States, under President Donald Trump’s aggressive tariff regime, has rolled out reciprocal trade agreements in 2025 that promise market access but demand steep concessions. Cambodia and Thailand—smaller economies with less leverage—emerged with deals that prioritize national autonomy and measured commitments.

Aspect	Malaysia	Thailand	Cambodia
U.S. Tariff Rate	19% (Executive Order 14257)	19% (Executive Order 14346)	19%
Trade Commitment Value	$240 billion (semiconductors: $150B, investments: $70B, LNG: $3.4B/yr, 30 Boeing aircraft)	$20 billion (aircraft, agriculture, energy over 5 years)	Minimal (specific commitments not quantified, focus on tariff exemptions)
GDP (Nominal, 2023)	$437 billion	$515 billion	$30 billion
Commitment as % of GDP	~55%	~4%	Negligible
Sovereignty Protection (Article 5.1)	Weak: Must adopt “equivalent restrictive effect” measures; no sovereignty safeguard; “goodwill” and “shared commitment” are vague	Strong: Complementary actions only if aligned with Thai interests; non-binding framework	Explicit: Actions must not “infringe on Cambodia’s sovereign interests”
Sanction Mirroring	Mandatory: Must match U.S. sanctions or face tariff penalties	Voluntary: Sanctions alignment tied to Thai priorities	Optional: Only if it serves Cambodia’s interests
Regulatory Autonomy	Compromised: FDA overrides drug approvals; halal certification optional; GMO imports mandatory	Preserved: Accepts U.S. vehicle safety standards but retains flexibility on implementation	Intact: Domestic laws on environment/labor prioritized
Cultural Protections	Eroded: Halal certification banned for U.S. imports; local content quotas for TV removed	Maintained: No clauses undermining cultural policies	Upheld: No mention of cultural concessions
FTA Flexibility	Restricted: U.S. can veto FTAs with third countries (Article 5.3.3)	Flexible: No explicit U.S. veto on third-party FTAs	Unrestricted: Sovereignty clause protects FTA autonomy
Key Concessions	1,711 tariff lines exempted ($5.2B, palm oil/semiconductors); Bumiputera policies at risk	99% of U.S. imports tariff-free; $30B trade surplus cut by 70% by 2030	100% U.S. industrial/agricultural goods tariff-free
Termination Risk	High: U.S. can reimpose tariffs for non-compliance (Executive Order 14257)	Low: Non-binding framework reduces penalty risks	Minimal: Sovereignty clause limits U.S. leverage
Strategic Outcome	Overcommitted: High financial pledge; sovereignty eroded	Balanced: Modest commitments; autonomy preserved	Defensive: Minimal commitments; sovereignty prioritized

The Cambodia Model: Ironclad Sovereignty in a Fragile Economy

Cambodia’s path exemplifies defensive diplomacy at its finest. As a landlocked nation with a nominal GDP of roughly $30 billion—barely a tenth of Malaysia’s—it faced the same 19% U.S. reciprocal tariff as its larger neighbors. Yet Phnom Penh’s negotiators embedded explicit protections into the US-Cambodia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, signed in October 2025. The preamble emphasizes a “shared commitment to sovereignty,” framing the deal as a partnership of equals rather than a subservient pact.

The crown jewel is Article 5.1, which mandates that Cambodia “regulate… in a manner that does not infringe on Cambodia’s sovereign interests.” This clause acts as a veto: Phnom Penh can mirror U.S. sanctions on third countries—such as export controls on Chinese tech—only if it aligns with Cambodian priorities. No “shared concern” ambiguity here; sovereignty is the non-negotiable filter. Environmental and labor commitments follow suit, requiring enforcement without weakening domestic laws to lure investment. Cambodia even secured tariff eliminations on 100% of U.S. industrial and agricultural goods entering its market, but without ceding control over intellectual property or digital borders that could flood local industries.

This approach isn’t bravado; it’s survival. By insulating core interests, Cambodia avoids the pitfalls of overcommitment, preserving policy space for its nascent manufacturing sector and rural economy. In a region where U.S. deals often double as anti-China maneuvers, Hun Manet’s government ensured the agreement enhances resilience without eroding autonomy.

Thailand’s Calculated Caution: Big Economy, Modest Bets

Thailand, Southeast Asia’s tourism and automotive powerhouse, demonstrates how scale can breed restraint. With a nominal GDP of $515 billion in 2023—projected to dip slightly amid global headwinds—Bangkok could have matched Malaysia’s ambition. Instead, the US-Thailand Framework Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, finalized in late October 2025, caps U.S. commitments at a prudent $20 billion in purchases across aircraft, agriculture, and energy sectors. This figure, spread over five years, targets surplus reduction without upending Thailand’s export-driven model.

Like Cambodia, Thailand locked in a 19% U.S. tariff rate, with zero-tariff exemptions for select goods under Executive Order 14346. But the real savvy lies in the non-binding “framework” structure: It commits Bangkok to eliminating tariffs on 99% of U.S. imports and easing non-tariff barriers—like accepting U.S. vehicle safety standards—while retaining flexibility on implementation. Article 5 echoes Cambodia’s sovereignty shield, requiring “complementary actions” on supply chain security only insofar as they bolster Thai interests, with no mandatory mirroring of U.S. sanctions. Thailand pledged to cut its $30 billion trade surplus with the U.S. by 70% by 2030, but through voluntary measures like increased LNG imports and IP enforcement, not ironclad quotas.

This calibrated exposure reflects Thailand’s middle-power mindset. As a treaty ally under the 1966 Treaty of Amity, Bangkok leverages historical ties without mortgaging future policy. Commitments to digital trade openness and environmental standards are robust, yet they stop short of regulatory surrender—ensuring Thai firms in EVs and renewables aren’t sidelined by American giants.

Malaysia’s High-Roller Gamble: $240 Billion for What?

Enter Malaysia, where ambition veered into overreach. The US-Malaysia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, inked amid fanfare in Kuala Lumpur, secures the same 19% tariff but balloons into a $240 billion behemoth: $150 billion in semiconductors and data centers, $70 billion in U.S. investments, up to 5 million tonnes of annual LNG at $3.4 billion yearly, and 30 Boeing aircraft with options for more. For a $437 billion economy—smaller than Thailand’s—this isn’t diversification; it’s dependency on steroids.

Worse, the sovereignty clauses are a giveaway. Unlike Cambodia’s explicit veto, Malaysia’s Article 5.1.1 demands “equivalent restrictive effect” measures to align with U.S. national security actions, guided by “goodwill” rather than safeguards. No mention of Malaysian interests trumping foreign dictates; instead, vague “shared commitments” open the door to U.S. vetoes on FTAs with rivals like China. Appendix provisions erode further: FDA approvals override local drug regulations, halal certifications are optional for U.S. imports, and GMO food standards must align with American “science-based” norms. Bumiputera policies face scrutiny as potential “discrimination” against U.S. firms, potentially gutting affirmative action tools.

Malaysia’s negotiators hailed exemptions for 1,711 tariff lines—covering palm oil and semiconductors worth $5.2 billion—as a win. But at what cost? The $240 billion pledge, dwarfing Thailand’s by 12-fold despite a smaller GDP, risks fiscal strain and policy paralysis. If U.S. demands escalate—say, on rare earth exports or digital taxes—Kuala Lumpur’s leverage evaporates under termination threats tied to Executive Order 14257.

Strategic Genius or Sovereign Suicide?

Thailand and Cambodia prove that protectionism abroad doesn’t demand self-sabotage at home. Both nations, facing identical tariffs, extracted concessions while ring-fencing autonomy—Cambodia through veto clauses, Thailand via modest, phased commitments. Their deals enhance trade without auctioning regulatory sovereignty or cultural priorities like halal standards.

Malaysia’s $240 billion lunge, against a GDP edge over Cambodia but trailing Thailand, smacks of desperation. Are we crazy? Perhaps not—leaders may eye short-term export booms in chips and LNG. But mad? Absolutely, if it means subordinating national interests to Washington whims. In the ASEAN arena, true power lies not in the biggest bet, but in the smartest fold. Malaysia’s soul isn’t sold yet, but at this rate, the deed is in the mail. Parliament and the public must demand a renegotiation: Sovereignty isn’t a bargaining chip; it’s the table itself.