Thursday, 24 August 2023

Taliban-like Hadi goes moronic with 3R attacks

 No News Is Bad News

Taliban-like Hadi goes moronic with 3R attacks

KUALA LUMPUR, Aug 24, 2023: The moronic and Taliban-like PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang continues to use race and religion as tools for political mileage.

In so doing, he is biadap (rude) to even the symbol of Malay Supremacy - the Malay Rulers.

The Malay Rules have spoken out much since the conclusion 15th General Election and state elections, dissuading all to stop using the 3R (Race, Religion and Royalty) as the tool for political mileage.

However, Hadi persists in bashing the DAP as the most covenient scapegoat to sow hatred to win political support from the Malays.

In the lates Hadi’s DAP, DAP, DAP tirade, he implied that certain quarters (the DAP?) who have “enslaved” the judiciary and courts to sideline and belittle Islamic laws.

In so doing, is Hadi implying that the DAP is more powerful than the Malay Rulers who are heads of Islamic Councils in Malaysia? He has forgotten the following Koran verses with his fervent use of 3R-bashging:

 

It sure looks like Hadi’s new found political power has gotten to his head - he thinks he is God, Judge, Jury, Executioner and above all, prime minister.

Constitution of Malaysia 1957

PART IV - THE FEDERATION

Chapter 1 - The Supreme Head

Article 32

(1) There shall be a Supreme Head of the Federation, to be called the Yang di- Pertuan Agong, who shall take precedence over all persons in the Federation and shall not be liable to any proceedings whatsoever in any court.

(2) The Consort of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (to be called the Raja Permaisuri Agong) shall take precedence next after the Yang di-Pertuan Agong over all other persons in the Federation.

(3) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall be elected by the Conference of Rulers for a term of five years, but may at any time resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Conference of Rulers or be removed from office by the Conference of Rulers, and shall cease to hold office on ceasing to be a Ruler.

(4) The provisions of Part l and lll of the Third Schedule shall apply to the election and removal of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

Source: http://www.commonlii.org/my/legis/const/1957/4.html 

And

The Federal Constitution empowers the state governments to administer the Islamic affairs. The division of power between the state governments and the Federal power is in line with religious leaders in the state, namely the Sultan in the Malay states of the monarchy. As for the states without Sultan, it is His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 

Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the Sultans have supreme authority in the affairs of the Islam in their respective states. In each state, the Islamic Religious Council is established and has absolute power on Islamic affairs assisting and advising the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Sultan in all matters relating to the Islamic affairs in their respective states.

To ensure that the Fatwa Institution functions properly, all the state governments isolate the administrative institutions of the State Islamic Council or the State Religious Department and the Syariah Courts in their respective states.

Perak Syariah Committee is a body that is placed under the Perak Islamic Religious Council. Thus, in discussing the background of the Perak Syariah Committee, it is better if we first discuss the history of the Perak Islamic Religious Council. This is because both of these entities are closely related to each other. The Mufti Department's staffs hold to FIVE SHARED VALUES in carrying out its mission towards achieving the vision set, namely :

M - Masu'uliyyah (Responsible)

U - Ubudiyyah (Devotion)

F - Faqeeh (Precision Knowledge)

T - Tasamuh (Tolerance)

I - Itqan (Thorough)

Source: https://mufti.perak.gov.my/en/profile/agency/introduction 

No News Is Bad News reproduces below a news report quoting Hadi from his Facebook posting: 

Some have ‘enslaved’ judiciary to belittle Islam, claims Hadi

The PAS president says it is compulsory for Muslims to oppose such groups.

FMT Reporters - 24 Aug 2023, 4:55pm

PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang said the party would not be ‘bought over’ despite its success in the polls.

PETALING JAYA: PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang has claimed that there are certain quarters who have “enslaved” the judiciary and courts to sideline and belittle Islamic laws.

He said it was therefore forbidden for Muslims to support these groups.

“And it is compulsory for Muslims to oppose them,” he said in a Facebook post, in a likely swipe at DAP.

He said PAS and Muslim NGOs, as well as the Malay rulers, would not allow such “extremism” to continue.

Hadi, however, said the current situation could not be compared to the time the Islamic party were allies with DAP under the then opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat.

He said PAS’s alliance with DAP then had only involved matters in which they shared similar ideals and it never touched on the Islamic faith or policies.

In 2015, the two parties severed ties after DAP accused PAS of pursuing the implementation of Islamic criminal laws without consulting its allies.

Hadi went on to say that his party would not be “bought over” despite the success achieved in the 1999 general election where it won 27 seats with the help of DAP.

“We also rejected better offers after winning the most seats in the 15th general election.”

PAS won 49 seats in the last nationwide polls.

OPINION

Investment and infiltration: Saudi Arabia’s long game in Southeast Asian politics – James Chin

Despite changed political priorities, Riyadh’s religious influence still present in region, particularly M’sia

Updated 2 hours ago · Published on 24 Aug 2023 10:07AM

The city skyline of Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. It is widely acknowledged that the Saudi Arabian government has funded schools, mosques and institutions globally with the aim of spreading its Wahhabi – also known as Salafi – beliefs, says the writer. – Pixabay pic, August 24, 2023

SAUDI Arabia has spent decades trying to spread its brand of Islam into Southeast Asia. While official Saudi funding is now less obvious, in Malaysia that investment is quietly paying off.

It is widely acknowledged that the Saudi Arabian government has funded schools, mosques and institutions globally with the aim of spreading its Wahhabi – also known as Salafi – beliefs.

Those beliefs advocate the establishment of an Islamic state, with Western-style democracy being seen as a threat to society. This could pose a threat to democracies like Malaysia, where Salafi adherents are gaining political influence.

Muslim-majority Malaysia and Indonesia have been prime targets for the Saudi propagators in Southeast Asia, with Indonesia highly prized as the world’s largest Muslim nation. 

The propagation has been ongoing for decades, mainly through education links, and Wahhabi/Salafi beliefs have established a firm foothold in both nations.

In Southeast Asia, scholars usually refer to Wahhabis as Salafists. Salafism refers to an interpretation of Islam that seeks to restore Islamic faith and practice to the way they existed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his early generations of his followers.

Its core tenets are close to Wahhabism and many Southeast Asian Muslims who follow these teachings prefer to be known as Salafists. Early generations of Muslims, known as the Salaf, were closest to the Prophet Muhammad both in time and proximity.

Salafis now appear to be much more influential in Malaysian politics than in Indonesia because they occupy middle- and top-level positions in both political parties and government institutions. 

But many Muslims and the wider communities in both countries mistake them as simply being part of the conservative Islamic establishment rather than Salafis. 

They overlook the commonality among the Salafis in both countries, which is the rejection of Western democracy and pluralism as a viable political system. Some Salafis believe that capturing political power under a nation’s existing system is a prerequisite for setting up an Islamic state.

Influence entrenched via education

Saudi Arabia’s political influence will always be present in Malaysia and Indonesia because of the education links built in the 1980s, although true Saudi influence in politics is difficult to map when so few adherents display their Salafi leanings openly.

Flush with oil money in the late 1970s, Saudi Arabia began using education as its main method to quietly spread Salafism to Southeast Asia and the rest of the world.

Saudi embassies in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur have a religious attaché whose job is to recruit students and maintain ties with Islamic organisations that are friendly to Salafism. 

The embassies also fund the construction of mosques, religious schools and the organising of events and forums.

One clear motivation for Saudi Arabia, which is part of the Sunni sect in Islam, to assert its influence in Indonesia and Malaysia was the competition with Iran.

Saudi Arabia feared that Iran’s dominant Shia sect would spread to Indonesia and Malaysia.

Thousands of Southeast Asian students were given scholarships to study in selected Saudi universities. The Malaysian government also funded some students to study in Saudi Arabia.

Self-funded students have been recruited through personal links with religious schools in Saudi Arabia or their alumni in both countries. 

Some Saudi graduates opened their own madrasah (religious schools) when they came back to the region, while others became part of the wider community. In Malaysia, many joined the civil service and academic institutions but have maintained links among their cohorts.

Saudi graduates can now be found in every strata of Indonesian and Malaysian society. Some are prominent in the religious and political arena. The most influential Salafi are the ulama or religious teachers. 

Some ulama started their own madrasah to bypass the national curriculum. A few of them have also achieved the status of public intellectuals and appear regularly in the mainstream press offering their opinions on government and public policies. 

No central network or structure

The political turbulence created by the ascension of Mohammed bin Salman as the ruler of Saudi Arabia in 2017 will have limited impact on the Salafi movement in Southeast Asia. It has already undergone some indigenisation. 

Under Mohammed, there seems more emphasis on economic cooperation than the emphasis on the export of Saudi beliefs, consistent with his grand plan to modernise the Saudi economy, especially moving it away from oil. 

Official funding for Salafi networks in Southeast Asia has mostly dried up and is now done largely through personal ties with rich Saudi foundations and donors. 

It is often hard to study the Salafi movements in both Indonesia and Malaysia because Salafi networks don’t have a central network or structure and are loosely spread out.

In Indonesia, the organisation that is most often associated with Saudi influence is the Saudi-funded Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA), a private religious Jakarta university, and the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Society for the Propagation of Islam). 

Some militant groups, such as the now-defunct anti-Christian Laskar Jihad and the Jemaah Islamiyah, are known to be influenced by Salafi teachings. The best-known public Salafi networks in Indonesia are the Al-Turots (Islamic Heritage) network and the Wahdah Islamiyah. 

Some purist Salafis have rejected the need to enter active politics but instead want to concentrate on teaching. Others accept that to build the Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah), they need to engage in politics.

The Salafi movement in Indonesia included in this sphere is the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) although there are Salafis operating in other parties as well. Salafi political leaders do not identify themselves openly as Salafi followers. 

In Malaysia, the root of Salafi influence is similar to Indonesia with one important difference.

Before 2018, political power in Malaysia was held by Umno, a Muslim-based political party. In the early 2000s, Salafi ulama began a deliberate policy of infiltrating Umno, especially Umno’s young ulama wing.

Umno, hitherto a Malay nationalist party, welcomed these young Salafis as they provided religious legitimacy against its main political foe, PAS. – 360info, August 24, 2023

James Chin is professor of Asian studies at the University of Tasmania and senior fellow at Sunway University’s Jeffrey Cheah Institute

Published under Creative Commons and in partnership with 360info.org

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