Share to help stimulate good governance, ensure future of people & M’sia
No News Is Bad News
Why war-waging US fears China
KUALA LUMPUR, March 29, 2024: Chinese communities are generally hard working and practical beings.All over the world, they strive for survival, focusing on making money and business. The Chinatowns all over the world is testimony of the resilience of the Chinese survival.
Unlike the US, it is only bent on waging war, since World War II, and continues to do so till today. Why?
The evil Americans need war to survive - selling firearms and the likes of fighter jets.
On the other hand, China has only been focusing on transforming the country into a world economic power house via science and technology - now super hi-tech. (Watch above video)
That is why the US is losing out badly to China and its only response to stop China when it cannot compete in the global market is to cry “national security threat” to everything that China has achieved excellence in technology.
For image info, go to https://ins-globalconsulting.com/news-post/largest-automotive-producing-nations/
For image info, go to https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3229508/america-driven-fear-china-danger-all
No News Is Bad News reproduces below related news analysis articles:
An expert's point of view on a current event.
Here’s How Scared of China You Should Be
It all depends on the answers to these five questions.
Walt-Steve-foreign-policy-columnist20Stephen M. Walt
By Stephen M. Walt, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
A giant panda cub is seen at China's Chengdu Research Base of Giant Panda Breeding on Sept. 19, 2007 in Chengdu, China. PAUL GILHAM/GETTY IMAGES
A critical issue in current debates on U.S. grand strategy is the priority the country should place on competing with China. How many resources (money, people, time, attention, etc.) should the United States devote to this problem? Is China the greatest geopolitical challenge the United States has ever faced, or a colossus with feet of clay? Should countering China take precedence over all other problems (Ukraine, climate change, migration, Iran, etc.), or is it just one issue among many and not necessarily the most important?
For some observers—such as Elbridge Colby—countering China is the highest priority, and U.S. leaders must not allow themselves to be distracted by Ukraine or any other foreign-policy issues. My occasional co-author John Mearsheimer and my Harvard colleague Graham Allison seem equally concerned about the China challenge, and especially by what they see as a rising risk of war. A recent Council on Foreign Relations task force argued that military trends in Asia were shifting in China’s favor and called for redoubled efforts to reinforce deterrence, especially in the Taiwan Strait. Hal Brands and Michael Beckley think China’s power is nearing its peak and there’s little Beijing can do to arrest its eventual decline, but they see this potential window of opportunity as a cause for alarm rather than reassurance. By contrast, my Quincy Institute colleague Michael Swaine and Cornell University scholar Jessica Chen Weiss think we are exaggerating the danger China poses and worry that the two states will fall into a self-fulfilling spiral of suspicion that will leave both worse off no matter who ends up on top.
These varied assessments are but a small sample of the opinions you can find about China’s future trajectory these days. I don’t know who’s right—and neither do you—and I freely admit that some of these observers know a lot more about China than I do. I have my hunches, of course, but I’m mostly frustrated that the community of serious China watchers hasn’t achieved more of a consensus. As a public service, therefore (and maybe to inspire them a little), here are my top five big questions about China. The answers to these questions would tell you a lot about how worried you should be.
No. 1: Is China’s economic future bright, dark, or somewhere in between?
Power in international politics ultimately rests upon economics. You can talk all you want about “soft power,” the genius of individual leaders, the importance of “national character,” the role of chance, and much more, but the bottom line is that a country’s ability to defend itself and shape its broader environment ultimately depends on its economic strength. You need a large population to be a great power, but you also need substantial wealth and a diverse and sophisticated economy. Hard economic power is what enables a state to build lots of sophisticated weapons and train a first-class military, provide goods and services that others want to buy and that can enrich its own citizens’ lives, and generate surpluses that can be used to build influence around the world. Being recognized by others as competent and economically successful is also a good way to earn their respect, get them to listen to your advice, and enhance the appeal of one’s political model.
China’s economic performance over the past 40 years has been extraordinary, and no serious person believes its economy is going to deteriorate so much that it drops out of the great-power ranks. But as its sluggish post-COVID performance suggests, China’s economy is now facing growing headwinds that are unlikely to abate. Its population is aging and declining, which means ever-fewer workers will be supporting an ever-growing number of retirees. Youth unemployment is over 21 percent, and total factor productivity growth has declined sharply over the past decade. China’s financial system remains opaque and debt-ridden, and the real estate sector—a major source of prior growth—is especially troubled. Put these things together, and it’s easy to see why many analysts are pessimistic about its long-term prospects. As I’ll discuss in a moment, U.S. policy and the quality of Chinese leadership could make these problems worse.
Yet shorting China would be a risky bet. Its industries dominate some important sectors—including solar and wind technology—and its electric car industry is outperforming the rest of the world. Three of the world’s top construction companies (including the one with the largest annual revenues) are Chinese. It has gone to considerable lengths to secure access to critical minerals and metals and may eventually be in a position to deny some of them to others. There is every reason to expect China to remain a major economic player far into the future. The big question is whether it will blow past the United States, remain permanently behind on most dimensions of economic power, or achieve rough parity. If you knew the answer to that question, you’d be a long way to knowing just how worried you should be.
No. 2: Will U.S. export controls work?
How you answer the first question depends in part on whether you think the Biden administration’s economic war against China will be successful. By denying China access to advanced semiconductors (and related technologies), the United States is hoping to retain technological supremacy in this important sector. Although U.S. officials insist that these measures are limited to narrow national security concerns (what National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan characterized as a “small yard and high fence”), the real aim seems to be to slow China’s technological advance more broadly.
The question is whether this campaign will succeed over the longer term. Even a partial decoupling is never cost-free, and these restrictions will slow innovation in the United States and in the other countries that must go along with the U.S. campaign if it is to work. Technological barriers are never 100 percent effective, and this policy gives China a huge incentive to become more self-sufficient over time. For these and other reasons, well-informed experts disagree about how effective these measures will be.
Let’s not forget that when export controls do work—as they did against Japan in 1941—the target state may not sit back and take it. China is already retaliating against U.S. firms and allies, and its countermeasures may not stop there.
University students display a flag of the Communist Party of China to mark the party's 100th anniversary during an opening ceremony of the new semester in Wuhan in China's central Hubei province on Sept. 10, 2021.
No. 3: Is Xi Jinping another Mao Zedong or another Lee Kuan Yew?
China’s rapid rise began under its post-Mao “collective leadership,” even if Deng Xiaoping was “first among equals” in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy. Today, however, Xi has concentrated power to an extent unseen since Mao himself and cultivated a Mao-like cult of personality in which his thoughts are considered infallible and his decisions cannot be questioned.
Letting one person have unchecked power in a country is usually a recipe for disaster. No human being is infallible, and allowing an ambitious and willful person to operate without constraint makes it more likely that big mistakes will be made and go uncorrected for a long time. Just consider Mao’s ill-conceived Great Leap Forward (which caused a famine that killed millions), or the damage China suffered during the Cultural Revolution. If that’s not warning enough, consider the costs of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s disastrous views on monetary policy or the trainwreck Elon Musk is presiding over at the social media site formerly known as Twitter.
To be sure, there are a handful of individuals who defy the odds, consistently beat the market, and never seriously put a foot wrong. Maybe Warren Buffett or Lee approach this level of wisdom, but most leaders fall well short. My point is that China’s near- to medium-term future depends a lot on whether Xi is even half as smart as he thinks he is. He’s clearly a genius at consolidating power—as the recent purge of former Foreign Minister Qin Gang and several top military officers reminds us—but he also mismanaged the pandemic, undermined some of the brightest stars in the Chinese economy, and has presided over a steady decline in China’s global image. And the more power he amasses, the worse his policy judgments seem to be. Those of you who are bearish about China’s economic prospects might take heart in the fact that he’s probably in the job for life.
No. 4: Will Asia balance effectively?
One of Xi’s major failures was not doing more to discourage China’s neighbors from joining forces to keep Beijing in check. China’s rising power was bound to be of some concern to other Asian states, but openly proclaiming China’s global ambitions, embracing “wolf warrior diplomacy,” overreacting to perceived slights, and employing aggressive salami tactics against Taiwan and in the South China Sea made the problem worse.
The result? India and the United States continued to move closer, and they are now joined by Japan and Australia in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The AUKUS agreement has strengthened strategic ties (and security collaboration) between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Japan is increasing its defense spending rapidly and mending its delicate relations with South Korea. Farther afield, the European Union is becoming less enamored with Chinese investment, and public opinion in Europe and Asia has become much warier of China’s global role.
That said, the ultimate effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen. As I’ve written previously, a balancing coalition in Asia faces significant collective action problems, and Europe isn’t going to take on a major strategic role there. The distances separating these states are vast (which may tempt some states to pull back if trouble starts far away), nobody wants to lose complete access to the Chinese market, and countries like South Korea and Japan have a troubled past. Many of these states may want to let Uncle Sam handle China while they free-ride, which will undermine deterrence and could eventually lead to a backlash here in the United States. These same states also tend to get nervous if the United States becomes too confrontational, because they don’t want to be collateral damage in a Sino-American clash.
America and its Asian partners are actively balancing today—as balance of power/threat theory would lead us to expect—but whether they do enough of the right things is hardly a foregone conclusion. If they do, Chinese hegemony in Asia is much less likely and the risk of war goes down. If not, you should probably worry a bit more. Here, a lot depends on whether the United States can lead a potentially fractious coalition and find the sweet spot between doing too much and doing too little. Who wants to take a bet on that?
No. 5: What will the rest of the world do?
The final issue isn’t about China, per se; it’s about how the rest of the world is responding. A clear pattern is emerging: The Asian states most worried about China are moving closer to each other and gravitating toward the United States; most of Europe is reluctantly following America’s lead because they are still dependent on U.S. protection and thus don’t have much choice; Russia has little choice but to stick with its only major power partner; and medium powers around the world are hedging their bets, diversifying their strategic supply chains (trade and investment, diplomatic ties, and military support) and trying to avoid having to pick a side. For South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and some others, rivalry between China and the United States is an opportunity to play the great powers off each other and benefit from ties with both.
The key issue here is which of the two strongest powers plays this new game most effectively. The United States has squandered a lot of good will in the developing world over the past 30 years, and its failures have given China an opportunity. But China’s own actions—including the vaunted Belt and Road Initiative—haven’t been the game-changers many expected. Looking ahead, it’s easy to see a world order that looks surprisingly like the early Cold War: the U.S. aligned with Europe and much of East Asia and the Pacific, China aligned with Russia and some key states in the developing world, and other medium powers oscillating between them. The lineup on these scorecards isn’t a perfect match, and some of the players will have switched teams, but the overall pattern resembles the one we’ve seen before.
One more thing…
There may also be known unknowns out there, too. If you really want to worry about China, or if inflating the threat is part of your job description, you can always fall back on scary scenarios whose veracity is almost impossible for outsiders to determine. The Red Scare in the 1950s is a classic example: Lots of Americans genuinely believed that their society was being infiltrated and undermined by scores of people who pretended to be patriotic citizens but were in fact secretly loyal to their evil Kremlin overlords. Such fears were vastly overblown but also hard to disprove, for how can we ever know another person’s innermost thoughts and loyalties?
Viewed in this light, what are we to make of the recent New York Times story describing U.S. efforts to find and eliminate computer malware that Chinese hackers are said to have secretly embedded in critical U.S. infrastructure, perhaps in the hope of disrupting or delaying a U.S. military response to a future conflict? Fears of a cyber-Pearl Harbor have been around for a long time, but the article suggests that the danger is very real. It’s hard to know just how worried we should be, however, because we don’t know how effective the malware might be and we can never be 100 percent certain there isn’t some even more dangerous code lurking somewhere that our cybersecurity folks haven’t found yet.
Perhaps we should be really worried, but what struck me about the Times piece, which is based on interviews with unnamed senior administration officials (that is, on officially sanctioned leaks), is that it says almost nothing about U.S. efforts to do similar things in China. It quotes one Chinese official complaining about the cyberattacks it faces, which he says come mostly “from sources in the U.S.,” but otherwise the article is silent on what our own cyber-warriors are up to. It is hard to believe that China has been planting malware in critical U.S. infrastructure for years and those well-funded geniuses at the National Security Agency or U.S. Cyber Command have just been playing defense. If that is the case, we’ve got bigger problems to worry about.
So how scared should you be? I don’t know. If history is any guide, the United States is more likely to overreact to a possible China challenge than to under-respond, and the current bipartisan enthusiasm for confronting China on multiple fronts supports that prediction. But whether you think we are doing too much or too little depends to a considerable extent on how you answer the five questions listed above. I’d be ever so grateful if some smart China experts put their heads together and tried to narrow the range of disagreement. It would be even better if they did so publicly and laid out their sources and reasoning in as much detail as possible so that those of us who care about these questions could have better-informed debates on this vital strategic question.
March 4, 2022
Why Americans Fear China’s Rise
Though the United States seeks to confront its internal vulnerabilities, heightened awareness of them is driving a preoccupation with the challenge from China, and a tendency to overstate the nature and scope of that challenge.
by Paul Heer
THE BIDEN administration is right to characterize China as engaged in “stiff competition” with the United States. But the stiffness of the challenge stems not simply from Beijing’s global ambitions, massive resources, ruthless tactics, and Communist mindset. The U.S.-China competition is also keen because the United States has unilaterally squandered much of its competitive edge and is not bringing its best game to the playing field. Quite the contrary. Its economic, technological, and military advantages are at risk; its politics are polarized and dysfunctional; and its social fabric is fraying. Though the United States seeks to confront these vulnerabilities, heightened awareness of them is driving a preoccupation with the challenge from China, and a tendency to overstate the nature and scope of that challenge. This has magnified American threat perceptions, fueling a tendency to blame Beijing for problems that are largely made in the USA.
Deadly Pakistan attacks threaten China economic ties
Nikkei Asia
THE NARRATIVE has taken hold that the U.S. economy was hollowed out by job losses to China. Beijing, we are told, has been eating the United States’ lunch for decades. No doubt Beijing has engaged in a wide range of mercenary and often unfair trade practices aimed at scoring points for China and boosting its competitive advantage. But the United States itself has created opportunities for China to do so both fairly and unfairly. Can the Chinese be blamed for the loss of American jobs when U.S. companies voluntarily relocated them in pursuit of the comparative advantage China offered in terms of labor and operating costs? It is also true that Beijing’s economic diplomacy—especially under its “Belt and Road Initiative”—is opportunistically scoring points against the United States, often at the expense of transparent business practices and good governance in the countries China targets. But the United States, for whatever reasons, is not offering those countries many viable or attractive alternatives in terms of comparable levels of infrastructure investment and financial aid. As China scholar Evan Feigenbaum has observed, “whining isn’t competing.”
A more recent and obvious example is the obloquy directed at Beijing over COVID-19. Yes, the virus originated in China, and Beijing probably did less than it could have to contain its spread internationally. But it remains unclear how much of this lapse was attributable to the inevitable spread of a new virus before the accumulation of data makes its existence apparent, or to the systemic reluctance of Communist apparatchiks to acknowledge and report bad news. The latter explanation does not negate the former. More importantly, the severity of the subsequent impact of the virus within the United States was primarily America’s own fault, particularly given that Washington had several weeks of advance warning that Chinese leaders themselves did not possess. In short, Beijing bears some responsibility for COVID-19 reaching the United States, but there is no credible evidence that Chinese leaders intended for that to happen, and it would be ludicrous to try and hold them accountable for how the response to the outbreak was bungled after the virus arrived in America.
Fears have also arisen about Beijing’s “influence operations” in the United States, which have been characterized as “covert, coercive, or corrupt” and as designed to subvert democratic institutions, free speech, and even U.S. sovereignty. But this grossly exaggerates both Beijing’s intentions and its potential for success. Most Chinese influence operations in the United States are aimed simply at promoting Chinese views and interests through public diplomacy, lobbying, and cultural and academic programs. The U.S. intelligence community concluded that Beijing’s influence efforts during the U.S. 2020 presidential election campaign were aimed at “shaping perceptions of U.S. policies and bolstering China’s global position” rather than actually changing the outcome of the election. Certainly, Beijing exploits the openness of the United States in pursuing its influence agenda, and is also engaged in covert operations in the United States toward various ends. But whether China’s overt influence activities succeed in winning hearts and minds depends on how susceptible Americans really are to Chinese propaganda. If they are, that is another homegrown vulnerability—already apparent in the widespread embrace in the United States of disinformation and conspiracy theories. But as China scholar Susan Shirk has observed, “the harm we could cause our society by our own overreactions” to Chinese influence operations—by launching another “Red Scare”—is far greater than the damage being perpetrated by those operations.
Finally, alarmist reports from various sources routinely highlight Chinese advances in the military, technology, space, and cyber realms that threaten U.S. national security. Most recently, these have featured Chinese developments in hypersonic missiles, nuclear weapons deployment, and artificial intelligence. These all pose serious challenges to the United States that need to be confronted, but the dangers are exaggerated when China’s possession of military capabilities is equated with aggressive intentions, or when it is presumed that Beijing is determined to assert global supremacy in every sector. (Chinese leaders probably judge that sharing technology leadership with the United States and other countries is more achievable and sustainable.) More fundamentally, the U.S. fear of being outcompeted by China in these sectors is due in part to the recent erosion of longtime American advantages through inattention, misplaced priorities, and/or resource constraints.
South Korea medical professors resign in protest of government plan
Nikkei Asia
NONE OF this is meant to disparage the magnitude of the challenge from China. On the contrary, the U.S.-China competition is severe, structural, and systemic. China is challenging the United States’ post-Cold War status as the sole superpower, the wealthiest and most influential country in the world, and the putative leader of the international order. It is offering its governing model of authoritarian socialism as a viable alternative to democracy. And it is mobilizing its state sector to maximize every Chinese competitive advantage over the United States in trade and technology. But none of these challenges is existential or insuperable. Beijing is not seeking to eliminate U.S. power, wealth, and influence or to eradicate democracy and capitalism. Rather, it seeks a multipolar world in which China is also a “leader,” its interests are secure, and its governing model is accepted as legitimate. Even this vision, however, represents an extraordinary challenge to a United States whose political and economic models are stumbling, whose international reputation has eroded, and whose interests are not wholly secure. These vulnerabilities lend themselves to magnifying the China challenge into a zero-sum or winner-take-all contest in which neither side would find coexistence with the other system tolerable.
The historical context of these trends is important. The fact is that the United States, even before its recent domestic travails, was having more than its share of trouble acknowledging and adjusting to shifts in the global balance of power since the end of the Cold War, 9/11, and the global financial crisis. Whether or not one subscribes to the notion that the United States is in relative strategic decline, it clearly no longer is (if it ever was) a global hegemon that can set the terms of its engagement with the rest of the world at will. The United States no longer enjoys “primacy” either globally or in the Western Pacific, and this further amplifies the perceived threat from a more powerful and competitive China. The prevailing U.S. response to these new historical circumstances, however, seems to fluctuate between denial that U.S. primacy has been lost, and a tacit acceptance that it has—but with a determination to restore and sustain it, presumably into perpetuity. Perhaps the latter is possible, but only if America first gets its domestic house in order.
In the meantime, the United States seems to be resisting acknowledgement of its relatively diminished historical position in the world, and channeling its discomfort and domestic insecurities into a zero-sum contest with China—based on a faulty depiction of Beijing’s intentions and an apparent rejection of any symmetry in the U.S.-China relationship. This mindset is reflected in multiple aspects of the Biden administration’s approach to Beijing.
First and foremost is its overarching priority on competition, with only occasional acknowledgement of the potential for or utility of bilateral cooperation. This emphasis on stiff competition flows predictably from the intensity of the Chinese challenge and the increasingly apparent gaps in U.S. competitiveness. But the deemphasis on cooperation seems to indicate an aversion to interactions that Beijing might use to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and score points against Washington. Perhaps more likely, Biden’s reluctance to publicly promote cooperation with China—except on a handful of transnational issues like climate change—probably reflects a desire to avoid appearing accommodative or weak in dealing with Beijing when the United States is so politically divided and the “China threat” narrative has been so strongly embraced by both sides. But this risks negative long-term consequences. Although substantial cooperation with Beijing will ultimately be imperative, Biden appears unwilling to accept the domestic political risks of pursuing it—or at least of doing so explicitly and trying to defend and explain it.
This helps explain the administration’s overall position on “engagement” with China. Only rarely is the word used to refer to constructive interaction with Beijing. Instead, it is generally avoided on the grounds that “engagement” was an earlier policy approach that failed because it was based on false premises—particularly the notion that it would yield political liberalization in China. Accordingly, Kurt Campbell, the White House coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs, declared in May 2021, “the period that was broadly described as engagement has come to an end.” Another White House official said in November 2021 that “the Biden administration is not trying to change China through bilateral engagement” because “we don’t think that’s realistic.” - The National Interest
Tuesday 12 March 2024
The US fears China’s advanced IoT and AI technologies
Share to help stimulate good governance, ensure future of people & M’sia
No News Is Bad News
China’s Internet of Things (IoT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology are way agead of the rest of the world.
The US fears China’s advanced IoT and AI technologies
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIZ12lBzPpI (Live: China – Democracy that Delivers)
KUALA LUMPUR, March 12, 2024: Why is the war-waging US so antagonising against China?
The above CGTN video clip clearly shows China’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology is way ahead of others, including the US.
While China continues to strive ahead for excellence in science and AI technology, the US is wasting its time and resources on waging war everywhere.
In fact, China’s is also generally way ahead of the rest of the world in science and construction technology.
China has introduced an AI talk host to showcase its advanced AI technology.
Watch the talk show in the above video link and be amazed with the AI host.
Tuesday 12 March 2024
Another case of war-waging US’ fear of China
Share to help stimulate good governance, ensure future of people & M’sia
No News Is Bad News
.jpg)
.jpg)
Above is the war-waging US list of bombings from 1950 to 2015, and it continues engaging in wars globally until today.
This is what China has been doing for the global economy today.
For more articles on the US-China feud, go to
ilovemalaysiachinasilkroad.blogspot.com
Another case of war-waging US’ fear of China
KUALA LUMPUR, March 13, 2024: The above video clip is being shared in social media.
It showcases a Made-in-China self-contained mobile home in a self-driving van. It can accommodate five persons.
However, the US has banned its sales for security reasons and warned other nations the risks of privacy.
This is another clear case of moronic war-waging US’ fear of China’s advanced technologies.
What it cannot compete with China, the US bans for the flimsiest excuses and ridiculous reasons - and it is always about digital security and privacy.
While the US continues to be preoccupied with waging war all over the world, since 1950 till today, China focuses its time, energy and resources on advancing its high technologies.
Does anyone really buy the US warning that such a van is any threat to users?
Perhaps, only the Americans do.
The US can continue trying to undermine China’s technology advancement in science and technology at its economic peril.
China will forge ahead with new advanced technology products and capture the world commercial market - and there is nothing the US can do to stop others from buying China’s new products.
And the Chinese layman are also ingenious:
To Save On Rent, Couple In China Spent S$32K To Buy & Convert Van Into Tiny Home — And They Did It Mostly On Their Own
Yes, it has a bathroom, kitchen and even space to work.
08 Sep 2022 at 20:10
A couple in Shenzhen are now living the nomad life in a camper van that they bought and converted into a full-fledged tiny home for a total cost of 160,000 yuan (S$32,300).
Yes, the van comes with the full works — a bed, bathroom, TV, air-conditioning and more — most of which they built and installed themselves to save money.
Before the reno
Zhang Xi and his girlfriend Hu Anyuan, who moved from Wuhan to Shenzhen for work last July, cited high rents in the southern China city as their main reason for doing so.
Prior to this, they’d been renting a 107 sqft apartment. However, it was far from Zhang Xi’s workplace and he’d spend close to two hours taking three trains to go to work every day. He spent about 800 yuan (S$161) on transport alone, nearly a third of his 2,500 yuan (S$504) monthly salary.
And so they decided to buy a van and refurbish it into a camper van that they could live in. They reasoned that this is a viable option since rent in Shenzhen is too high and they cannot afford to buy a home there. Plus, they may return to their hometown to buy a house in a few years. According to the couple, they can save up to 50,000 yuan (S$10,100) by living in a van.
The secondhand van cost them 130,000 yuan (S$26,232), and they spent a total of 30,000 yuan (S$6,053) converting the van into a tiny home. Except for carpentry and electrical work, the couple built and installed everything else themselves.
On the left, storage cabinets. On the right, a kitchen countertop that doubles up as a breakfast bar and working space.
The van spans 86 sq ft. Of that, about 43 sq ft is usable living space.
The final result is a tiny home on wheels that has a bed, bathroom, TV, airconditioning, kitchen cabinets, wardrobe, and even a washing machine.
There’s also larger space for a dining area…
…which converts into a bed.
A compact stove and a kitchen sink that also doubles up as a bathroom sink
Bathroom
They’ve been living in their mobile home for over three months, and Zhang Xi says the best part is saving time on commuting to work daily, and having the freedom to drive to different parts of Shenzhen to sightsee on their days off.
Al fresco dining
The outside space is also good for workouts
However, there are some drawbacks to their unconventional home, such as having to keep track of power and water supply, and looking for a safe place to park. On some of the hottest days of summer, the couple has checked in to a hotel for three days due to the temperature inside the van rising up to 46.6 degrees Celsius. Anyuan also admits that, while they are able to cook meals in the van, she only does so on weekends as it’s more convenient to eat in the office on weekdays.
Zhang Xi and Anyuan have since gone viral for their unique tiny home, though some netizens have taken to nicknaming them “carpark beggars”, while others question if it’s safe.
However, the couple maintains that they are living the lifestyle they want and have even started vlogging about their daily life.
They plan to get hitched within five years and continue living in the van after that, and will only move into an apartment or house once they have kids. - M8days
Photos: Video screenshots
Deals on wheels: Housing prices drive young Chinese into RV living
By AFP - July 24, 2023 @ 9:07am
This photo taken on June 21, 2023 shows digital marketer Twiggy He sitting in her recreation vehicle (RV) in Shenzhen city, in southern China's Guangdong province. A growing number of young people in first-tier cities in China have taken one look at sky-high real estate prices and sought out an alternative arrangement -- living in recreation vehicle (RV). (Photo by Jade GAO / AFP)
SHENZHEN: With its open kitchen, bathtub and electric piano, Chinese e-commerce worker Twiggy He's home is the envy of her colleagues - even if it is located in their office carpark.
The cheery yellow refitted van, named "YOLO" (You Only Live Once), gives He a commute of two minutes from bed to desk, and has saved her thousands of yuan a month in tech hub Shenzhen, one of China's most expensive cities.
The 28-year-old is one of a growing number of young people in major cities who have taken one look at sky-high real estate prices and sought an alternative arrangement.
"I find living in an RV to be very freeing," He, who moved in four months ago, told AFP.
"It doesn't give me any anxiety about buying a house or make me feel I need to settle down... Maybe I'll even move to a new city in a few years."
Her monthly expenses have plummeted from when she rented an apartment, from around 2,500 yuan (US$350) a month to 600 yuan, with parking only 20 yuan a day.
She does, though, have to rely on public facilities to use the toilet.
For Zhang Xi, who started living in an RV with his partner last May before opening a van renovation workshop, cost was the main push factor.
"Shenzhen's property prices are beyond the reach of ordinary folks like me," he told AFP.
A recent survey by a property research institute suggested Shenzhen's rent-to-income ratio has reached up to 49 per cent, and buying is even worse.
On average, second-hand flats fetch 65,000 yuan per square metre -- nearly nine times the city's average monthly salary in the private sector.
Zhang and his wife plan to live in the van while they don't have children, saving around 3,000 yuan a month in rent and commuting.
They hope to put that money towards a down payment for a flat in a lower-tier city.
The walls of office worker Li Conghui's homey white van are lined with bunk beds, and drawings and photographs of his children, who live with their mother in a different city.
His wider family disapprove of his unconventional living situation.
"My wife is the only one who isn't against it," Li said. "But others don't understand where I'm coming from, they think it's too unusual."
Li has worked in Shenzhen for over a decade, but despite that "still couldn't get a sense of belonging" in the city.
"When I was living in a rented room, I didn't feel at home each time I went back," he said.
"But the RV is different. When I am inside this private space, I feel a sense of belonging."
Zhang agreed.
"It's felt just like a home to us," he said. "It's truly a place that belongs to us in Shenzhen."
Recreational vehicles take to China’s roads in numbers
According to rental company rv2go, more than 65 percent of RV owners are parents in the 30 to 45 age group living in first- and second-tier cities.
Yu Ran
China Daily
Recreational vehicles have become increasingly popular in China. CHINA DAILY
February 24, 2023
SHANGHAI – Ownership rises as more families seek diverse lifestyles
In the past decade, recreational vehicles, or RVs, have become increasingly popular in China — offering owners more freedom to enjoy diverse lifestyles.
According to rental company rv2go, more than 65 percent of RV owners are parents in the 30 to 45 age group living in first- and second-tier cities. They aim to use their vehicles as mobile homes for relaxing family trips to different areas of the country.
Du Luting, senior social media executive at Yuchen RV(Shanghai) Co, said: “More people are now buying these vehicles, which used to be the exclusive preserve of the wealthy just a decade ago. They are using them as mobile homes or for tourism.”
In July 2020, Sun Lin, 30, and his wife made an impulsive but life-changing decision to quit their stable jobs to buy an RV for a road trip, even though Sun’s wife was expecting a baby in the coming spring.
“We left our jobs, as we wanted to live a freer and more comfortable life. Using an RV as a mobile home on a road trip is a cool way to travel,” said Sun, who used to work at a State-owned enterprise, while his wife was a teacher.
“We moved from Harbin (capital of Heilongjiang province) to Hangzhou (the provincial capital of Zhejiang) to buy an RV in May 2020 and prepare for the trip.”
As a first-time owner, Sun chose the vehicle for its stylish design, which featured a signature large window at the rear. The couple set off on their trip from Hangzhou in July that year, when Sun’s wife was three months pregnant.
They spent the following four months traveling through Sichuan, Jiangxi, Hunan and Guizhou provinces — arriving in Hainan province in November.
“Traveling by an RV gives us more freedom. If we want to go to a particular place, we can sleep nearby, get a closer glimpse of local life, and relax,” Sun said.
The couple stayed in Hainan for the birth of their son, before continuing their trip in spring 2021, when he was more than three months old.
Sun Lin and his wife take their son to a beach in Hainan province. CHINA DAILY
While they were in Hainan, they drove the RV to an area close to a beach, where they created a makeshift small backyard and even built a small sandcastle for the boy.
“For us, the most important thing about a trip by RV is that it gives us a better life. Although our vehicle is comparatively small, it enables us to embrace nature anytime and anywhere we want to,” Sun said.
Two types of RV are available in China — self-driven motor homes and towable vehicles or trailers. The former are relatively small, while the latter provide more space but require an additional vehicle. According to national traffic regulations, motor homes should be no more than 6 meters long.
To provide a more comfortable living area for the family, Sun decided to change his RV to a larger-sized towable vehicle.
“Every coin has two sides. We chose a towable RV, which is more comfortable and gives us additional space. We can now better plan trips and locate camping sites, as we want our child to enjoy the journey and get closer to nature with ourselves and our pet,” said Sun, who brought a border collie during the trip.
He plans to buy a property in Hangzhou in order to have a permanent address for their kid to be enrolled in school, but the couple is determined to continue the trips.
“We want to enjoy different experiences together. We always look forward to our next trip and next destination,” Sun said.
Lu Yinuo and her husband spent 460,000 yuan on a RV last year to experience camping holidays with their family. CHINA DAILY
Market growth
According to statistics released by the China Automobile Dealers Association in March, the nation’s RV market grew by 30 percent in the past two decades. The first such vehicle independently developed and produced domestically came off the production line in 2001.
A report from Intelligent Research Group shows that the number of RVs in China rose from 48,600 to 69,432 from 2016 to 2017, and in 2020, the total exceeded 218,000.
In 2019, a total of 459,700 trips were made in self-owned RVs in China, and 72,500 journeys were taken in rented RVs. The following year, 648,100 trips were made in self-owned RVs, while the number of journeys taken in rented vehicles fell to 71,000.
Du, from Yuchen RV (Shanghai) Co, said, “The RV market in China is quite small compared with those in the United States and Europe, but it is expected to witness promising development, especially following the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.”
The increased popularity of camping in smaller RVs priced from 200,000 to 300,000 yuan ($29,140 to $43,710) has attracted more young people to pursue so-called Vanlife (van plus lifestyle).
Vanlife, which has become popular globally in recent years, is pursued by the younger generation seeking more freedom. Numerous Vanlife videos have been posted on various social media platforms, attracting large audiences.
Influenced by Vanlife, Lu Yinuo, 33, from Hangzhou, spent 460,000 yuan on an RV last year for her family to enjoy camping holidays.
“In recent years, the term work-life balance has gained traction among the younger generation. I believe more young people will pursue freedom and pleasure in the future,” said Lu, who has been on weekend camping trips with her family for the past two years.
A long period of traditional camping left Lu and her husband a little exhausted, so he proposed buying an RV. As the couple planned to have a second child, they thought a mobile home would be more convenient for camping and traveling.
The couple uses the vehicle as a remote office on weekdays — returning home the same day — for camping during weekends, and for road trips two to three times per year.
“We used to travel the world every year, so my first child had been to 11 countries before turning 4. The COVID-19 pandemic didn’t stop us exploring and longing to see more of the world, and my family really took to camping,” Lu said.
After buying the RV, the couple no longer needed to worry about preparing sleeping bags and packing lamps, kitchenware, food and heating equipment for trips in winter. Lu and her husband now have more time and energy to play with their children and enjoy a slow-paced life while camping.
“Life on the road is always full of surprises, difficulties and joy — time when we solve problems and enjoy nature. The children see insects and plants they learn about from picture books, and become more adventurous in trying new things,” Lu said.
She added that her son realized his dream of falling asleep under the stars, before waking to see the sun rise.
According to the 2021 China RV Market Inventory released by the China Automobile Dealers Association, the annual sales volume for domestic self-driven RVs reached 12,582 in 2021, a rise of 43.2 percent year-on-year. The monthly average sales volume exceeded 1,000, while annual sales of towable RVs stood at 3,543.
In the first quarter of last year, cumulative sales of RVs reached 2,425, a rise of 17 percent year-on-year — the highest for that period for the past five years.
Mi Yao parks in the countryside. CHINA DAILY
Extensive research
Unlike those buying on impulse, Mi Yao, 31, from Guangdong province, carefully selected his vehicle as a 30th birthday present after carrying out research on RVs for two years from 2020.
When he started working five or six years ago, he had already been to more than a dozen countries. Inspired by the RV culture in Europe and the US, Mi began learning everything he could about the vehicles.
“Compared with a normal road trip, the best things about RV travel are the comfort and the leisurely pace of life, as the vehicle’s facilities and appliances provide me and my family with a greater sense of security. My vehicle is like a fully functional mobile supply depot,” said Mi, who runs a media company that shoots travel videos. Every month, Mi makes an effort to take his parents for outings in the RV, and also travels in the vehicle on his own from time to time.
Although he has not traveled as much as full-time RV bloggers, he has had many unforgettable times on the road.
For example, when a severe spell of cold weather hit Guangdong province, he parked outdoors overnight just to experience the low temperatures. During a heavy downpour, he sat listening to the rain in his vehicle, which was the only one in the parking lot.
“For me, the best thing about RV trips is that they allow me to observe life from different perspectives and get closer to nature. The way in which I communicate has also been broadened by making videos about my RV travels,” said Mi, who posts this footage on different platforms.
He suggests that first-time RV buyers determine whether they really need such a vehicle, and if they can cope with the parking problems that come with it.
“The RV is not a perfect combination of car and home, but it provides us with a new way of life completely different from the traditional. Some owners are full-time RV travel bloggers who travel to different places all year round, while others choose to use the vehicles as their home,” Mi said.
He is now planning to make a trip of 15 to 25 days — his longest yet — possibly to scenic areas such as the southwest and northwest of the country.
Meanwhile, Qu Bei, 34, who comes from Henan province, uses his RV as a temporary home to avoid commuting to work in Beijing.
“Due to the pandemic last year, I had to spend much longer traveling back and forth every day, so I came up with the idea of having an RV as a home, with lower costs and greater efficiency,” Qu said. In 2015 he could not afford an apartment in Beijing, so he bought a small one in a neighboring city.
It took him about three months to decide to buy an RV fitted with solar panels and other facilities. Since then, he has stationed the vehicle in a parking lot near his office, and it takes him just three minutes to get “home” after work.
“The biggest problem of living in the RV is the limited use of water and electricity, so I have to calculate usage regularly to ensure I have sufficient supplies. I also have to overcome noise by wearing earplugs to sleep,” Qu said.
He recently posted a video online comparing life in the RV to living in a rented apartment in Beijing. Qu, who received many inquiries about using the RV as a mobile home, said that perhaps more people want to follow him in exploring the numerous uses of these vehicles.
“They offer a new way of life for Chinese people, as RVs relieve the pressure of buying a property,” he said.
According to QYResearch, the scale of China’s RV market in 2021 rose to 27.17 billion yuan from 2.19 billion yuan in 2014, and was expected to reach 33.43 billion yuan last year.
However, there are still problems to be solved before the RV market achieves mature development in China.
Du said: “There are not enough camp sites for RVs, which is the key factor limiting development of this market in China. Manufacturers of these vehicles should improve quality to meet buyers’ needs, while purchasers should avoid buying on impulse simply to follow a trend.”
Too-Tall Chinese RV Has Second Story Sun Room And Two Slideouts
It even has an elevator.
Feb 19, 2021 at 2:03pm ET
By: Chris Bruce
While an RV with a popup roof isn't too weird, the SAIC Maxus Life Home V90 Villa Edition is the first one we're familiar with that has a whole second story, complete with a balcony, that extends out of the top. If that's not special enough, there's even an elevator for accessing this area.
From the outside, this Maxus looks like a fairly normal, van-based RV. One notable feature is at the back where massive LEDs outline the rear area.
Gallery: SAIC Maxus Life Home V90 Villa Edition RV
Stepping inside, the Maxus Life Home V90 Villa Edition shows off lots of luxury. There are large windows on each side, and these sections slide out to create 215 square feet (20 square meters) of living space. In the press photos, the company shows the interior with blocky, modern furniture and a neutral color palette, which creates a comfier atmosphere.
Wild RVs:
⠀ 
Hymer CrossOver RV And Camper Van Debut With Serious Off-Road Chops
Three-Axle Dodge Dakota-Based RV Is One Rare Bird
The kitchen includes a cooktop and an oven, so you could make Thanksgiving dinner in this rig. There's also a fridge and sink. In the back, there's a bathroom with a shower.
When extended the upper area is airy and looks ideal for an area to sit down and enjoy the view. There's 133 square feet (12.4 square meters) of space. The awning over the top is illuminated so the relaxation can last well into the night. The windows are adjustable between clear and opaque in case folks up there want some privacy, according to New Atlas. A doorway allows access to the balcony that's positioned over the van's cab.
Pricing for the Maxus Villa Edition in China starts at ¥2.68 million ($413,140 at current exchange rates). SAIC doesn't sell its RVs on the American market, so don't expect to see this double-decker wonder at a campsite anytime soon.
For more images and reports, go to https://www.google.com/search?q=China%27s+latest+self-contained+home+van&oq=China%27s+latest+self-contained+home+van&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQIRigATIHCAIQIRigATIHCAMQIRigATIHCAQQIRiPAtIBCjM0MDQwajBqMTWoAgCwAgA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
No comments:
Post a Comment