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DAP has proposed that the 16th General Election (GE16) be held simultaneously for both Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies (DUN), especially in Peninsular states, to ensure better party preparations and cost savings.
Will multi-racial Malaysians politically bury racial and religious bigots in GE16?
KUALA LUMPUR, Dec 31, 2025: What’s in store for politics and Malaysians next year (tomorrow)?
State elections are expected in Johor, Malacca, and Sarawak next year.
Will Malaysia’s 10th Prime Minister (PMX) Anwar Ibrahim call for a snap general election to pave the way for simultaneous state and parliamentary elections to be held nationwide?
The time appears to be right following the deadly political split in Perikatan Nasional (PN), mainly between the Taliban-like PAS and the racist Bersatu led by the outgoing unpatriotic Muhyiddin “I Am Malay First” Yassin., who officially quits as PN chairman tomorrow.
Will multi-racial Malaysians rise to politically bury all the racial and religious bigoted politicians led by Umno’s youth chief Dr Akmal “Dr Ham/I Am Malays First” Saleh?
No News Is Bad News reproduces below a political take on Facebook:
Socio-political Issues (Malaysia)
1. By far the most consequential political development anticipated in 2026 is the series of state elections expected in Johor, Malacca, and Sarawak.
In the last Johor and Malacca state elections, UMNO secured convincing victories under the leadership and shadow of Najib Tun Razak. That political reality no longer exists. Najib is now incarcerated, and following repeated and decisive defeats in court, it is increasingly clear that he is likely to spend the remainder of his life behind bars.
With their once-winning general removed from the battlefield, UMNO now faces an existential question: will the party be galvanised by Najib’s downfall and fight to reclaim his legacy, or will it be so demoralised that it collapses under the weight of his absence?
The answer may emerge as early as March 2026, when UMNO is expected to hold its party elections. The mood of the grassroots, shaped heavily by Najib’s final legal defeat, will likely determine whether UMNO enters the coming state elections with resolve—or resignation.
Sarawak: The Election That Matters Most
Even more critical is the Sarawak state election, widely expected to take place in 2026. Its outcome will speak volumes—not only about the future of the PH-led government in Putrajaya, but about the long-term cohesion of the Malaysian federation itself.
After suffering a heavy defeat in Sabah, Putrajaya simply cannot afford to lose Sarawak. Yet the uncomfortable truth is this: Putrajaya does not appear to have a realistic chance of winning there.
Sabah’s recent political revolt was driven by the “Sabah First” ideology—an idea originally inspired by Sarawak’s own “Sarawak First” doctrine. If the imitator was able to inflict such a decisive defeat on the federal government, it is difficult to imagine the original being any less brutal.
Should Putrajaya lose Sarawak by a margin equal to or worse than its loss in Sabah, that defeat is likely to generate political momentum that carries through to the next general election, projected for 2027, potentially precipitating the collapse of the PH-led Madani government.
More troubling still, repeated electoral thrashings in Borneo could serve as the psychological and political catalyst for renewed secessionist sentiment, accelerating the unravelling of the federation itself.
Considering all this, the three state elections—Johor, Malacca, and Sarawak—stand head and shoulders above all other developments as the single most anticipated political event of 2026.
2. Almost every major component of the unity government has, at one point or another, threatened to walk away.
UMNO says it wants to leave
MIC says it wants to leave
DAP says it wants to leave
MCA says it wants to leave
But will any of them actually do so?
Following its poor showing in the Sabah election, a visibly panicked DAP issued an ultimatum: recognise the UEC, or DAP would leave the unity government within six months. However, public response to the ultimatum was tepid at best. After Anwar Ibrahim announced a cabinet reshuffle—and after the government firmly rejected the idea of recognising the UEC—DAP has since grown noticeably quiet.
Whether DAP will honour its ultimatum or quietly pretend it never happened remains an open question—one that may only be answered by mid-2026.
DAP’s tensions with UMNO extend beyond policy. UMNO leaders have expressed anger over the way certain DAP politicians—most notably Puchong MP Yeo Bee Yin—appeared to celebrate Najib Tun Razak’s court verdict. Najib’s subsequent conviction in the 1MDB case, which added another 15 years in prison and billions in fines, further inflamed UMNO’s grassroots, reigniting calls for the party to exit the unity government in protest.
On a smaller but still relevant front, MIC—which has openly discussed leaving BN and the unity government for months—appears increasingly likely either to exit or be forced out in early 2026. MCA, another minor coalition partner, may also finally be compelled to decide whether it wishes to remain within the unity framework.
Whether these threats are genuine or mere political posturing remains unclear. But if a sufficient number of parties do leave, the critical question becomes unavoidable:
Can the unity government survive if everyone threatens to leave—and some actually do?
3. Perikatan Nasional has long struggled to sustain a coalition that runs against the natural order of politics.
Why is it against the order of nature?
Because PN is led by its weaker partner.
Bersatu, which insists on leading PN, is weaker than PAS by nearly every meaningful metric: party machinery, grassroots reach, ideological clarity, leadership depth, membership size, and overall public support. Yet Bersatu remains unwilling either to improve itself sufficiently to justify leadership—or to humble itself and accept PAS as the coalition’s natural leader.
This unresolved contradiction has strained Bersatu–PAS relations for years. The latest manifestation of that strain surfaced in the Perlis Menteri Besar dispute, where Bersatu attempted to wrest the MB post from PAS—its own coalition partner.
Rather than strengthening itself by confronting its political opponents, Bersatu chose to cannibalise its ally. That act has almost certainly pushed the relationship to the brink of irreparable damage.
The coalition still holds—for now—because neither party has a viable alternative. But politics is fluid, and circumstances inevitably change. When they do, it is difficult to see how Bersatu and PAS can continue pretending that this betrayal never occurred.
4. UMNO’s party election in March 2026 will answer one of the most pressing questions in Malaysian politics: will Ahmad Zahid Hamidi remain UMNO president?
Zahid is deeply unpopular within the party. It was his decision to call the November 2022 general election that transformed what could have been a manageable outcome into a devastating defeat. Prior to that election, UMNO had momentum—winning both Melaka and Johor, while Najib’s imprisonment had stirred sympathy and mobilisation among the grassroots.
Zahid squandered that momentum.
Despite UMNO’s collapse, he emerged not weakened, but elevated—securing the position of Deputy Prime Minister, while also receiving DNAA decisions on 47 corruption-related charges. This stands in stark contrast to Najib Tun Razak, the party’s more popular figure, who has faced relentless legal defeats.
Since UMNO’s last internal election in 2023, Zahid’s leadership has taken the party from bad to worse. He retains power largely because he enjoys the support of Anwar Ibrahim, and because he has systematically neutralised potential challengers such as Khairy Jamaluddin and Hishammuddin Hussein.
Whether Zahid can continue clinging to the UMNO presidency—despite the party’s deteriorating condition—will be one of the most closely watched political dramas of 2026.
If 2026 has a defining theme, it is this:
Survival, fragmentation, and reckoning.
State elections, coalition fractures, opposition realignments, and leadership battles will converge to determine not just who governs—but whether Malaysia’s current political architecture can endure at all.
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